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Abstract—Like many desktop operating systems in the 1990s,
Android is now in the process of including support for multi-
user scenarios. Because these scenarios introduce new threats to
the system, we should have an understanding of how well the
system design addresses them. Since the security implications of
multi-user support are truly pervasive, we developed a systematic
approach to studying the system and identifying problems. Unlike
other approaches that focus on specific attacks or threat models,
ours systematically identifies critical places where access controls
are not present or do not properly identify the subject and
object of a decision. Finding these places gives us insight into
hypothetical attacks that could result, and allows us to design
specific experiments to test our hypothesis.
Following an overview of the new features and their imple-
mentation, we describe our methodology, present a partial list of
our most interesting hypotheses, and describe the experiments we
used to test them. Our findings indicate that the current system
only partially addresses the new threats, leaving the door open
to a number of significant vulnerabilities and privacy issues. Our
findings span a spectrum of root causes, from simple oversights,
all the way to major system design problems. We conclude that
there is still a long way to go before the system can be used in
anything more than the most casual of sharing environments.
I. INTRODUCTION
As the Android operating system evolves, and the devices
supporting it become more capable, more advanced function-
ality and features become available to the end-user. Two of the
most recent major enhancements to Android are multiple users
(MU), introduced in version 4.2 (API 17) in November 2012,
and restricted profiles (RP), introduced in version 4.3 (API 18)
in July 2013. Targeted towards sharable devices such as tablets,
these enhancements strive to provide individual user spaces on
a single physical device. Each user space supports a separate
set of accounts, apps, settings, files, and user data, distinct
from those of the primary owner [1]. Google has introduced
two means of adapting Android to address these multi-user
scenarios.
Multiple Users (MU) designates the main account as
Owner. Through the device settings, the owner account may
create additional MU accounts. These secondary accounts are
essentially the same as the owner, except for the fact that they
cannot manage (i.e., create, modify, delete) other users. MU
accounts enjoy most of the other privileges and functionality
of the owner, including managing the device’s wireless and
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network settings, pairing Bluetooth devices, customizing sound
and display settings, installing/removing their own apps, ad-
justing privacy settings (e.g., location access), and configuring
security features (e.g., screen lock, credentials). Each account
also has a separate virtual SD card storage area within the
physical SD card.
Restricted Profiles (RP) are similar to MU accounts, but
they lack several key functionalities compared to owner and
MU accounts. Like MU accounts, RP accounts cannot manage
users. In addition, RP accounts are restricted from installing
apps. Instead, the owner account “turns on” specific apps from
the set of installed apps for the RP account.
Although one might reasonably assume that these en-
hancements would provide isolation among users and profiles
similar to that provided by today’s desktop multi-user systems,
forebodingly, Google’s own recommendation regarding their
use is for owners to share their device with only people they
trust [2]. To security-minded individuals, statements like these
raise red flags. In our case, it gave extra motivation to our
investigation.
A. Motivation
Since its introduction, the Android operating system has
enjoyed tremendous success, to the point now where over 1.5
million new devices are being activated every day [3]. This
astounding growth is not only in regards to the sheer number
of devices running Android, but also in terms of the different
types of devices running the system. More so than ever,
Android is expanding beyond the smartphone and becoming
the operating system of choice for a variety of “keyboardless”
and embedded devices such as tablets, home entertainment
equipment, automobile dashboards, and appliances. While
smartphones are usually personal single-user devices, many
of these other applications and devices exist in a multi-user
environment. Thus, the need for multi-user support in Android
grew along with its expansion from strictly personal devices to
those with varied purposes in multi-user environments. Today,
upwards of 27% of devices in use are running one of the three
newest versions of the operating system capable of the multi-
user features that debuted a mere 18 months ago. It is clear that
Android is rapidly evolving towards a multi-user environment,
rather than having it designed-in from the beginning, a path
which is concerning from a security point of view given the
clear and substantial implications that a multi-user environment
has on the system.
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This uncertain foundation and rapid expansion of Android
into multi-user environments provides the motivation and
impact of our work. By gaining insights through detailed
understanding and systematic exploration of the system, we
are able to hypothesize about potential security problems and
design effective experiments to test them. Our findings indicate
that the evolution towards a system that meets established
security principles is far from complete, and point to a failure
to reconsider a change in the original assumption of a single
benign user. We demonstrate situations whereby a secondary
user can bypass restrictions, gain unauthorized privilege, spy
on other users, and create denial of service. Our findings
represent a spectrum of root causes, from what we believe
are simple oversights, all the way to major system design
problems.
B. Threat Model
As stated earlier, Google recommends sharing multi-user
devices only with trustworthy people. Unfortunately, varying
definitions of trust, different expectations for security and
privacy, and a wide variety of use cases make this a very
ambiguous statement. On the other hand, immediately iden-
tifying a specific threat model or scenario at the outset of
our investigation would risk narrowing the field of potential
insights we are hoping to gain. Instead, we have deliberately
designed our investigation such that insights and knowledge
are first gained through systematic analysis, independent of any
particular threat mindset. Only then do we pose hypotheses that
factor in specific threat scenarios. Details of these are given in
Section III-C.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section II
gives more details on how multi-user has been implemented
in Android. Section III describes how we went about discov-
ering and evaluating key aspects of the new system features.
Section IV presents our findings, Section V gives an overview
of related work, and Section VI discusses the findings and
concludes the paper.
II. BACKGROUND
Before describing our investigation, a brief technical
overview of the implementation of multiple users is needed.
The following section is divided into four parts: Android
framework extensions, filesystem configuration, kernel mech-
anisms, and run-time considerations. For this discussion, the
Linux user ID and group ID are referred to as uid and
gid, respectively, while IDs within the Android framework
are denoted by userId, and appId.
A. Framework - userId
Version 4.2 added the android.os.UserHandle class
to represent multiple users on the device. This class designates
userId 0 as the device owner, and several special userIds
to represent all users (-1), the current user (-2), the current user
or self (-3) and the null user (-10000). Actual userIds are
assigned by the UserManagerService (also introduced in
4.2) when new users or new restricted profiles are created by
the owner. This class defines the starting userId as 10, and
increments it by 1 every time a new user is created, until the
number of current users equals the maximum number defined
by the system property fw.max_users. State is maintained
in /data/system/users/userlist.xml, where a list
of currently-assigned users and the next available userId
is stored. userIds are not re-used when a user is deleted,
in order to avoid leaking an old user’s files to a new user.
userIds are assigned in the same way regardless if they are
for a secondary user or a restricted profile.
As has always been the case, each installed application is
assigned an appId.1 android.os.Process class defines
ranges of appIds that can be assigned to different types of
apps. Normally, these IDs range from 10000 to 99999.
In the past, there was no defined userId, so the uid
was just the same as the appId. To enable kernel isola-
tion of apps among multiple users and profiles, the uid
is obtained by combining userId with appId using the
expression uid = userId * PER_USER_RANGE + (appId
% PER_USER_RANGE), where the default PER_USER_RANGE
is 100000. Likewise, userId and appId can be found
from uid with userId = uid / PER_USER_RANGE and
appId = uid % PER_USER_RANGE, respectively. The new
UserHandle class includes the methods for performing these
conversions.
Thus, uid is a two-digit userId (00, 10, 11, 12, ...)
concatenated with a five-digit appId (10000, 10001, ...).
For example, an app with appId 10056 will run with uid
0010056 when started by the owner (userId 0), and uid
1010056 when started by the first secondary user or restricted
profile (userId 10).
System uids not directly associated with apps are still in
the range 0-9999. For example, root is uid 0, system is
uid 1000, radio is uid 1001, and shell is uid 2000.
B. Framework - Permissions
Several new permissions have been introduced
with the advent of multi-user support. These include
MANAGE_USERS, INTERACT_ACROSS_USERS and
INTERACT_ACROSS_USERS_FULL, which are used to
protect some types of inter-user functionalities such as
startActivityAsUser(). Generally, checks for these
permissions are bypassed if the calling process has a root
or system uid. Several are also bypassed for processes
running as shell. As signatureOrSystem permissions,
they will not be granted to apps not in the /system partition
or signed with the platform key.
C. Framework - Package Management
To accommodate multiple users, Android’s package man-
agement system was modified so that secondary users can
choose different sets of installed apps, and the owner can
choose which apps are enabled or disabled for RPs. However,
as currently implemented, package management is still largely
platform-centric rather than user-centric. Although it may
1Before the introduction of multi-user, uid and userId were used inter-
changeably to refer to the unique identifier for each app installed on the system.
In versions with multi-user extensions, userId is used to denote the actual
user, while appId is the designation for each app’s unique ID. However,
there are still several instances of code and files that use userId to refer to
apps. For example, the sharedUserId tag in AndroidManifest.xml
actually refers to package names which will share the same appId.
2
appear that each user has their own independent set of apps
installed, in reality, each app is installed once for the entire
platform, and then either enabled or disabled for each user.
Evidence of this is seen in the fact that a device with multiple
users still has only one packages.list file to map package
names to corresponding data directories, appIds, and gids.
Moreover, there is only one packages.xml file for associ-
ating package names and appIds with signature keys, native
library paths, code paths, granted permission(s), and special
conditions such as sharedUserIds. Notably, this file also
associates the aggregate permission list for sharedUserId
packages to appId without regards to any particular userId.
Because the content and structure of the above files was not
changed for multiple users, PackageManager keeps track
of each user’s specific app installation status by way of a
package-restrictions.xml file for each user (default
location: /data/system/users/<userId>/). As such,
when an individual user installs an app for themselves, the app
is really installed for all users on the entire platform, and then
simply “hidden” from other users by tagging the package name
with inst=false in package-restrictions.xml.
We confirmed this by manually removing a <pkg name>
tag that contained inst=false from a secondary user’s
package-restrictions.xml, and observing that the
app is now available to that user.
D. Filesystem
To support multi-user, several changes to the filesystem or-
ganization were made. Whereas the single user’s app data was
previously stored under /data/data/<package_name>,
this data is now isolated for each user under /data/user/
<userId>/<package>. To maintain backwards compati-
bility, the owner’s (userId 0) app data is still stored un-
der /data/data/<package>, with a symbolic link from
/data/user/0 to /data/data. Subdirectories in these
locations are owned by the uid for the respective user and
app. Strong isolation is achieved through the use of Linux
bind mounts and filesystem namespaces [4].
E. Kernel
Since Linux is naturally a multi-user system, implementing
Android’s multi-user extensions at the kernel level did not
require any changes to the kernel itself. For all versions of the
Linux kernel used in Android, the Linux uid is an unsigned
32-bit integer which can represent over 4 billion unique uids.
Thus, the uid discussed above, formed from the Android
userId and appId, uniquely identifies both the user and
app, and is directly used as the Linux uid. In this way,
standard Linux discretionary access control (DAC) can provide
isolation not only among apps, but also among each user’s
installation of a particular app.
F. Run-time
On a running device, only one user can be “logged in”
at any one time. However, through the switch users function,
multiple users introduced the concept of the current user,
which refers to the user interacting with the device. We refer to
other users who may have been using the device before it was
switched to the current user as “inactive users.” Although these
Fig. 1. Investigation problem space showing various subject-object combi-
nations. Adapted from [5] with the permission of O’Reilly Media, Inc.
users cannot interact with the device, many of the underlying
processes associated with their active session, are left running.
Their apps are paused and their background services may be
left to run. On builds we have used, there is a limit of 3 to the
number of users that can be inactive before their processes are
completely removed.
III. INVESTIGATION METHODOLOGY
At the core of any security investigation lies the question
of whether the system design is based on valid assumptions.
As Android evolves into a multi-user system, what once
may have been a set of valid assumptions may suddenly be
undermined by emerging system characteristics and/or usage
models. In particular, the original assumption of a benign,
single-user environment is no longer valid. Rather than a single
owner who has administrative authority over most aspects of
system configuration and would not attack or intentionally
mis-configure his own system, there is now an environment
where it is plausible for secondary users to bypass restrictions,
attack other users, or deliberately reconfigure the system in an
unauthorized way.
A. Scope
In defining the scope of our investigation, we look towards
an overall architecture of Android. We begin with Yaghmour’s
[5] high-level architectural view shown in Fig. 1. Although
this diagram is not specific to multi-user, we consider it in
that context because of our focus. This diagram shows broad
categories of system resources such as stock apps and system
services, which become our subject and object categories.
Our goal is to find subject-object combinations that have
interesting security aspects unique to the multi-user case,
and then evaluate the suitability of the access control path(s)
between them. We specifically focus on scenarios whereby a
secondary user exercises all possible paths to access resources
and/or gain privileges.
1) Subjects: With the above in mind, the subjects we
consider are apps and user interface (UI) elements that the sec-
ondary user can install and use. This list includes user-installed
as well as stock apps (e.g., Settings), with the key difference
being privilege (stock apps can have signatureOrSystem
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(a) System access control points.
(b) Person-based access control.
Fig. 2. Simplified access control models.
permissions while user-installed apps cannot). In Fig. 1, these
are labeled as SUBJECT A for the case of a user-installed
app making API requests to other parts of the system, and
SUBJECT B for cases whereby the user interacts with stock
apps to access resources.
A very important difference about the subjects we consider
compared to those of the single-user case is that the secondary
user who launched the app may not necessarily still be the
current user. For example, components of an app launched by
a secondary user prior to switching to another user may still
function.
2) Objects: The resources available to the subjects dis-
cussed above are represented as the object in our access control
investigation. Examples from Fig. 1 include public interfaces
of other apps (OBJECT 1), services (OBJECT 2), abstracted
hardware devices (OBJECT 3) and kernel objects (OBJECT
4).
The most important difference about objects we consider
compared to those of the single-user case is that some re-
sources may be shared with other users on the device. For
example, hardware devices such as the camera, or common
settings databases are objects that are shared among multiple
users on the device.
3) Access control paths: Between these subjects and ob-
jects are communication paths that may include access control
mechanisms. We draw upon the work of [6], [7], and [8] to
present the simplified models of Fig. 2 that show communica-
tion paths pertinent to our investigation.
Fig. 2(a) depicts each app and system service contained
by separate sandboxes as indicated by the dotted lines around
them. Communication among these sandboxes (denoted by
bi-directional arrows) is done through Intents and Binders.
Using Intents, apps may request access to services or providers
(path ¬) or launch exported activities of other apps (path
­). These paths include access control points provided either
by the system (as part of the Intent mechanism), or at the
public interface of the object itself. Using the native interface,
apps may also use system calls to directly request resources
controlled by the Linux kernel (path ®), and these are subject
to Linux DAC. These three paths are permission-based, access
control list (ACL)-based, or some combination of these.
Fig. 2(b) shows another communication path with access
control typical of smartphones and tablets, that performed by
the user (path ¯). In this case, the current user makes the
decision to allow or disallow access to a resource such as
location, for instance. We refer to this as person-based access
control to avoid confusion with the notion of users on the
device.
A fifth type of path, not shown, are those that have no
access control along them.
B. Questions & Insights
As we study the inner-workings of Android’s multi-user
features, we are able to make two observations. First, the
new features have introduced important new considerations
for the subjects and objects shown in Fig. 1. Examples of
this include the concept of apps run by a userId that
is different than that of the current user, and person-based
access control decisions being made by multiple individuals.
Second, even though none of the access control paths of Fig.
2 are unique or dedicated to the extensions, some have been
modified to account for the presence of multiple users on
the device. Examples include methods that include checks
for INTERACT_ACROSS_USERS permission and apps that
express different versions of their UI to restricted users than
they do to the device owner.
These observations lead us to the following top-level ques-
tions for our investigation:
1) Do Android’s access control points properly account for
the new considerations regarding subjects and objects?
2) If not, can a secondary user exploit these shortcomings,
and what is the potential damage?
In order to answer these questions, we enumerate all of
the meaningful subject-object combinations within the broad
categories identified by Fig. 1, and identify the corresponding
access control paths from Fig. 2. This gives us a comprehensive
list of specific things to study. For example, a user-installed app
(SUBJECT A) can send an Intent using startActivity()
to launch any exported activity of any other app (OBJECT
1). Thus, we study the system’s Intent mechanism and the
specifics of how these activities are exported. Specifically,
we examine the source code in order to determine what
considerations, if any, do the Intent mechanisms and exported
activities give to multiple users. If none or partial, we consider
whether there should be protections and how a secondary user
might exploit the shortcomings.
C. Hypotheses About Multi-User Security
This last step allows us to develop a set of hypotheses
which can be used to design experiments for testing the ade-
quacy of access controls and demonstrating the consequences.
We present a partial list of our most interesting hypotheses
here:
1) Secondary users may be able to bypass their restrictions
by exploiting the unprotected public interfaces of system apps:
Secondary users are supposed to lack certain capabilities that
the owner has, such as mobile plan settings. However, from
our study of how access control restrictions are implemented
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in Settings, we see that many are accomplished by way of
hiding portions of the UI, while the corresponding activities
are exported publicly. This situation corresponds to a particular
OBJECT 1 in Fig. 1 (Settings) that is shared among all users
without adequate access control along path ­ of Fig. 2(a).
Results from testing this hypothesis are contained in Section
IV-A.
2) Secondary users may be able to maliciously reconfigure
critical platform-wide settings that are persistent across user
switches: Secondary users possess certain administrative ca-
pabilities (e.g., network settings) that are normally reserved
for privileged users on mature multi-user systems such as
Linux. Under Android’s single user assumption, some of these
settings are protected by person-based access control since UI
interaction by the benign user is required to prevent mali-
cious apps from making invisible changes programmatically.
However, when the benign user assumption is invalid, Fig.
1’s shared resources protected only by Fig. 2(b)’s person-
based access controls (path¯) can be maliciously manipulated.
The consequences are even more severe for cases where the
configurations are persistent across user switches, such as in
the case of network configuration. Results from testing this
hypothesis are contained in Section IV-B.
3) Inactive users may be able to spy on active users by
exploiting improper access control enforcement on shared
hardware resources: As mentioned above, multi-user exten-
sions introduce the concept of current and background users.
However, unlike a true multi-user system such as Linux, which
generally allows multiple remote logins simultaneously, there
can only be one active user “logged in” an Android tablet
at any one time. However, our enumeration of Fig. 1 objects
discovered apps and services that have access to shared objects
and are allowed to continue operations even after a user switch
occurs. Of these, certain ones such as audio, camera and
location have obvious privacy implications if used without the
current user’s knowledge or consent. From an analysis of the
implicated access control paths ¬ and ¯ in Fig. 2, we find that
authorizations granted when the secondary user is the current
user may not be properly reconsidered after a user switch.
Results from testing this hypothesis are contained in Section
IV-C.
4) sharedUserId permissions may not be properly sep-
arated when sharedUserId apps are installed by differ-
ent users: Multiple users extensions bring with them the
idea that each user may have different settings, preferences,
and apps. Obviously, these should be isolated such that one
user cannot accidentally inherit permissions or capabilities
from another. Because our enumeration of all subject and
object combinations of Fig. 1 included apps that leverage the
sharedUserId feature, we discovered problematic situa-
tions with overprivilege that can occur when different users
install apps with sharedUserIds. In particular, we see that
access controls at Fig. 2(a) locations ¬, ­, and ® fail to
differentiate the subject because each sharedUserId app’s
permissions are commingled with others of the same appId in
a single packages.xml file shared among all users. Results
from testing this hypothesis are contained in Section IV-D.
5) A malicious user may be able to exploit the shared
package management system to modify another user’s app
bytecode or prevent them from installing apps with package
names identical to ones installed by the attacker: The shared
package management mechanism that led to Hypothesis 4 is
also the cause of other problems. Since package installation
is platform-centric rather than user-centric, changes by any
user authorized to install apps will affect all users on the
platform. Specifically, if a secondary user upgrades a package,
the bytecode changes affect all users that have that package
installed. Likewise, if a malicious user installs a fake app with a
real app’s package name, all users are prevented from installing
the real app. Results from testing this hypothesis are contained
in Section IV-D.
To test these hypotheses, we designed and conducted
experiments using Android 4.4.2_r1 [9]. The details of
these experiments and our findings are the subject of Section
IV.
IV. FINDINGS
A. Unprotected Activities
Hypothesis 1 states that secondary users may be able to
bypass their restrictions by exploiting the unprotected public
interfaces of system apps. To find out if this is true, our
experiment must first identify the intended restrictions placed
on a secondary user, and then compare them with the full set
of exposed interfaces.
To understand the intended restrictions on secondary users,
we systematically mapped and compared the UI accessible to
the owner with that for a secondary user. A privileged app
where significant differences have been observed is Settings.
Settings is important to consider from a security point of view
because it is granted the SignatureOrSystem permissions
such as WRITE_SECURE_SETTINGS.
From our UI mapping, we observed that Settings imple-
ments a number of UI restrictions based on type of user by
hiding certain menu items. As such, we assume these are
capabilities that secondary users are not supposed to have.
As an example, we consider virtual private network (VPN)
settings which is hidden from the secondary user by way of
logic within WirelessSettings.java. This logic com-
pares the current user’s userId with that of the owner and
executes removePreference(KEY_VPN_SETTINGS) if
not equal.
With an understanding of how Settings presents a restricted
UI to secondary users, we compared the list of restricted UI
elements with exported activities in the app’s manifest to find
which of these elements can be launched directly via intent
[10]. Among this set is our VPN example, which can be
accessed by secondary users with the following code:
1 Intent intent = new Intent();
2 intent.setClassName("com.android.settings",
3 "com.android.settings.Settings$VpnSettingsActivity")
;
4 startActivity(intent);  
Among the many other examples we found are mobile
network & mobile plan settings (under Wireless & Network
settings), and backup & reset settings (under Personal settings).
Secondary users can access these activities because of a lack
of access control along path ­ of Fig. 2(a), such as a check of
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UserHandle.myUserId(). Thus, each of these examples
represent potentially dangerous situations since these activities
allow a secondary user to manipulate configuration settings
that may be able to be used to negatively affect the owner or
other users of the device.
As it turns out, our example of VPN contains additional
access control checks in Vpn.java that do properly identify
the subject and prevent restricted users from connecting VPNs.
Thus, for VPNs at least, the hypothesis is only partially true.
Because of the numerous cases of restricted UI elements also
being exported to all users, we intend to further investigate
these other cases in our future work.
B. Unrestricted Administrative Functions
Hypothesis 2 states that secondary users may be able to use
device configurations which are persistent across user switches
to attack other users. Although related to Hypothesis 1, this
case does not involve a user bypassing restrictions, but simply
implementing a malicious environment using the UI elements
freely available to them.
To test this hypothesis, we built an experiment around
network configuration, since this function is usually reserved
for administrative users on standard multi-user platforms. We
found that all users, secondary, restricted profile or otherwise,
have full access to WiFi settings and can add and config-
ure network connections as they choose. Furthermore, these
settings are common to all users since they are ultimately
stored by the system in a single /data/misc/wifi/wpa_
supplicant.conf file that has no provisions for identi-
fying the user who has authorized a particular connection.
Finally, our experiment showed that WiFi connections are
persistent across user switching.
This arrangement enables a secondary user to connect a
multi-user device to a malicious hotspot and control all traffic
to/from the device while it is being operated by other users.
The hypothesis is true and the situation represents the fifth case
mentioned in the Fig. 2 discussion, that of no access control.
C. Use of Sensors and Hardware Devices by Multiple Users
Android provides various hardware features such as media
resources and sensors. In single user context, all hardware
interfaces belong to the same user without any constraints.
Ideally, in multi-user context, a hardware resource should only
be bound to a single user at a time, defined by the currently
logged in user. Since the hardware interfaces are shared among
the users on an Android device, the transition from single to
multiple user framework requires changing the access control
model on hardware resources to make sure that a hardware
resource is only granted to the logged in user.
In this section, we aim to answer Hypothesis 3 from
Section III-C. That is, non-logged in secondary users can ex-
ploit improper access control enforcement on shared hardware
resources to spy on current users. In fact, if Android does not
enforce proper access control on shared hardware resources
based on user status, a non-current user can still use a hardware
interface to infer various information about the logged in users
and spy on them. If a non-current user can query the light
and accelerometer sensors over a time interval, he can infer
potential activities about current user such as whether he is
sitting indoors, or jogging outdoors. Moreover, if he can query
the GPS service, he can even infer where he is sitting or
jogging. Even more concerning, if he can launch the sound
and camera recorders, he can know easily more details such
as with whom he is and what type of conversation he is having.
To ensure that a hardware resource is only bound to the
currently logged in user, Android should be able to identify if
the user requesting a resource is logged in. Also, it should
track if the user who initiated the request is continuously
logged in during the service lifetime. More specifically, if a
user switching happens, Android should be able to revoke any
resource access from non-logged in users.
Our investigation focuses on checking if Android multi-
user framework enforces access control on shared hardware
resources based on user status. We systematically study media
resources and common sensors; for each studied resource, we
design an attacking app that will enable a user to try to access
that resource even if he is not logged in. We exploit the
fact that ActivityManager does not kill all non-current
user processes unless under limited memory usage to create
an attacking channel and potentially leak information from
hardware resources about a victim user. The attacking app is
launched when the malicious user is logged in, and will be
continuously running after he logs out and the victim user
logs in. We specifically assigned a non-owner user to be the
attacker, and the owner to be the victim since non-owner is
less privileged compared to the owner. We report our findings
below.
1) Media resources: Android media resources provide var-
ious media interfaces such as video and audio recording and
playing. Ideally, to ensure that a non-logged in user is not
able to use its services, the following two access control points
should be enforced:
• At request time: when an app requests a resource, the
system should check if its userId is equal to the current
userId. If not, the request should fail.
• At user switch time: when a user is logging out, the
system should revoke any earlier resource access and stop
the recording.
To check if these access control points are properly en-
forced, we designed an app that launches the camera (without
a preview window) and starts video recording under two
scenarios:
• The app intentionally schedules video recording when the
victim user is logged in (in an estimated amount of time).
• The app starts video recording immediately while the
attacker is logged in.
We launch this app from the attacker user account
(userId 10) and switch to the victim account (userId 0).
In the two scenarios, our app is able to record video in the
context of the victim account. The recordings will be saved
under the non-current attacker’s app data directory.
Fig. 3(a) demonstrates the process of our attack. The
magnified icon on the attacker screen indicates the running
camera recording app. After user switch, the recording app
is not killed and continues working in the background. Fig.
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(a) Spying attack mechanism.
(b) Process list showing attacker’s process (u10_a76) still running
while victim (userId 0) is active.
Fig. 3. Exploiting shared media resources to spy on current users.
3(b) shows the output of the Linux ps command at the same
time as the victim screen in Fig. 3(a) is being shown. The red
rectangle highlights the attacker’s process, left running even
though the attacker is no longer the current user. Moreover, as
depicted on the victim screen, there is no icon or notification
showing the background recording app. The victim is thus not
aware that he or she is being recorded, unless she checks the
currently running apps belonging to the other user through the
Settings app or by running ps as we have done. In either
case, the victim does not have the privilege necessary to stop
the process, short of powering off the device.
The success of our attacking app under the first scenario
reveals that there is not proper access control at request time
based on user status. To confirm this conclusion, we investigate
how an app can launch media recording. In fact, the app has
to invoke the method start() on the MediaRecorder
class. This class initiates an interprocess communication (IPC)
call to the MediaServer, which provides all services related
to Androids Media framework such as media playback and
media recording. Ideally, on MediaServer’s side, Android
has to check if the user requesting to start the recording is
currently logged in and grant the service accordingly. However,
MediaServer does not perform this access control, leading
to the success of our app under the first scenario.
By inspecting the call chain of
MediaRecorderClient::start() within
MediaServer, we observer that there is no access
control based on user status at any point. Even if the access
control is correctly granted at request time based on the
status of the user, MediaServer should also be able to
revoke the granting once a user switch takes place, since it
will invalidate the earlier access control decision. However,
since our app succeeds under the second scenario (i.e., does
not stop recording when user switch happens), we can infer
that MediaServer does not perform any access control
at switch time based on user status. In fact, based on our
inspection of the MediaServer code, we found that user
switch is not handled at all.
2) Motion, environmental and position sensors: Most An-
droid devices have built-in sensors that provide various infor-
mation such as motion, environmental, and position. Motion
sensors include accelerometers, gravity, rotational vector sen-
sors, and gyroscopes. Environmental sensors measure ambient
air temperature, pressure, illumination and humidity, while
position sensors measure the physical position of a device.
Unlike the media recording activity, these sensors’ ac-
tivity follows an event-driven approach. That is, an app
first registers a listener to receive sensor events through the
SensorManager, then the SensorService will deliver
any occurred sensor events to the registered listeners.
To ensure that a non-logged in user is not able to receive
sensor updates, the SensorService should either prevent
the non-logged in user from registering sensor listeners or from
receiving sensor updates. More specifically, at least one of the
following two access controls should be applied:
• At registration and switch time: the SensorService
should allow only current users to register listeners to
receive sensor events and should unregister all listeners
belonging to a user once he is no longer logged in.
• At dispatch time: the SensorService should deliver
sensor events only to listeners belonging to the current
user.
To investigate if any of these access control points is
enforced, we have developed an app that logs detected sensor
event changes over a specific threshold under the following
two scenarios:
• The app schedules registration to receive sensor events
when the victim user is logged in.
• The app registers a listener to receive sensor events when
the attacker user is logged in.
Similar to the media recording attack (Fig. 3), we launch
the app from the attacker account and switch to the victim
account. Our app is able to receive sensor events about detected
changes under the victim account environment in both the two
scenarios, without his awareness. The logs are saved in the
attackers account. Please note that we have performed the
attack for all sensors available on a Google Nexus 7 tablet.
The attack is successful in all cases.
From the results of our experiment, we can infer that none
of these access control points are enforced. To confirm this,
we investigate how apps register listeners to receive sensors
events and how events are delivered.
An app registers a listener to receive sensor events through
invoking SensorManager.registerListener. We
checked the call chain of this API and found out that the
SensorService does not apply any access control to
check if the app registering a sensor listener belongs to the
current user, which explains why our app was able to register
a listener under the first scenario. Moreover, by inspecting
the SensorService code, we found out that it does not
unregister listeners belonging to non-current users once a user
switch takes place.
However, no access control at registration/switch time
does not necessarily imply a security flaw if proper access
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control is enforced at dispatch time. However, the success of
our attack proves that there is no access control at dispatch
time based on user status. We confirm this by inspecting
SystemSensorManager.DispatchSensorEvent call
chain, and finding that the system delivers sensor events to
all listeners regardless of the status of the user who registered
them.
3) Location sensor: We have performed the same at-
tack on the GPS location sensor and found that a
non-current user cannot succeed in getting GPS loca-
tion updates of the logged in user. We investigated
LocationManagerService and found that it applies
proper access control based on user status at dispatch
time. Specifically, the method LocationManagerService
.handleLocationChangedLocked will only dispatch
location updates to the registered listeners belonging to the
current user, using the userId check shown here:
1 int receiverUserId = UserHandle.getUserId(receiver.mUid);
2 if (receiverUserId != mCurrentUserId) {
3 // skip update
4 }  
Here, the LocationManagerService keeps track of
the current user in mCurrentUserId. Every time a user
switch happens, LocationManagerService changes its
value to reflect the id of the new logged in user. A similar
design should be applied to other shared hardware resources.
D. Shared Package Information
Hypotheses 4 and 5 state that specific problems may occur
due to the fact that Android apps belonging to different users
share critical package information:
1) Apps sharing the same appId in different users share
permissions. As a result, the effective permission of these
apps is the union of the declared permissions for each app
and the sharedUserId apps escalate their permissions.
This is the essence of Hypothesis 4.
2) An app installed for different users share the same app
package information. Consequently, one user may trigger
a package update to modify the app’s manifest file or code
without other users’ consent. This is Hypothesis 5.
To design an experiment to confirm these two problems,
we need to first understand more about how the package
manager stores and uses an installed app’s package and its
relevant information. In the package manager, all the package
information among users are stored in a global hash map
mPackages.
The keys of this hash map are package names, and the val-
ues are packages including permissions and code information
of the packages. Hence, we realize that mPackages is app
name-based, rather than user-based, confirming the platform-
centric approach to package management that remains at the
core of the multi-user framework. With this as a basis for our
understanding, we can now discuss the testing of each of these
hypotheses separately.
1) Permission leakage in sharedUserId apps: An-
droid’s sharedUserId feature allows apps signed with the
same key to share permissions and data. Previous work in the
single user environment has shown this convenience feature to
have risks due to implicit capability leaks among apps [11].
Although sharedUserId app’s data ends up being properly
isolated in multi-user due to Linux’s use of the uid (which
accounts for both appId and userId), this is not the case
with permissions. In fact, these capabilities are leaked across
user boundaries, even if a particular user only has one of the
sharedUserId apps installed. This occurs because of the
platform-centric design of PackageManager.
During installation, permission sets are stored in
packages.xml, while installation status is stored in
separate package-restrictions.xml files for each
user. For sharedUserId apps, permissions from each
app are combined within the <shared-user> block in
packages.xml. During boot, the package manager loads
this permission list into the hash map mPackage in a way
that makes it impossible to separate the individual permis-
sions from each sharedUserId app in case a particular
user does not have them all installed. As a result, when
sharedUserId apps from the same developer are installed
in varying combinations by different users on the same device,
every single app gains the union of permissions from all of the
sharedUserId apps installed on the platform, regardless
of which sharedUserId apps have been installed by that
particular user.
To confirm this, we created a pair of sharedUserId
apps. shareduidapp1 declares INTERNET permission, and
shareduidapp2 declares READ_CONTACTS permission.
We then installed shareduidapp1 under the owner’s ac-
count only, and shareduidapp2 under a secondary account
only. After installation, we observed the following snippets
present in packages.xml:
1 <package name="com.example.shareduidapp1" ... sharedUserId="
10056">
2 <package name="com.example.shareduidapp2" ... sharedUserId="
10056">
3 <shared-user name="com.example" userId="10056">
4 <perms>
5 <item name="android.permission.READ_CONTACTS" />
6 <item name="android.permission.INTERNET" />
7 </perms>  
Here, shareduidapp1 and shareduidapp2 share
userId 10056 as shown in the <package> blocks
above. Separate from the package names, within the
<shared-user> block, userId 10056 is then associ-
ated with the two permissions. However, no structure re-
tains the fact that the INTERNET permission was con-
tributed by shareduidapp1, and READ_CONTACTS was
contributed by shareduidapp2. The record of which
users have these apps installed is contained in each user’s
package-restrictions.xml file.
Because of the commingling of permissions within
packages.xml, when user 10 runs shareduidapp2,
the system grants both INTERNET and READ_CONTACTS
permissions even though shareduidapp1 is not installed
for the user. Meanwhile, Settings reports shareduidapp2
only holds READ_CONTACTS permission. This condition also
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Fig. 4. Package install procedure.
occurs for shareduidapp1 run by user 0. Each user is un-
aware of the permission leakage and over-privilege. Moreover,
if user 10 is a restricted profile for which the owner carefully
enabled apps based on their reported permissions, this leakage
could allow the restricted profile accesses they should not have.
2) Package-based code sharing across users: All users
share the same package code for a specific package name,
because the package manager creates only one package object
for a specific app. To differentiate users who have installed the
app, the package manager maintains an array variable called
userState. Based on this design, there is no way for a user
to have a stand-alone copy of code for a specific package.
The app install or update procedure is depicted in Fig. 4.
When PackageManager receives the package install/update
request, it will first check if this is a new install or not. As
long as the package has been installed by at least one user,
the package manager considers that as a update. If it is a
new install, a new package object is created and the app is
installed for the install user. Otherwise, the new package will
replace the existing package for the install user. Before the
package manager takes action to update package information,
it performs a signature comparison check. If the signatures do
not match, the system will deny the update request as shown
in Fig. 5.
If installing an app for a specific user, the package manager
will traverse all the available users and mark the installing
user’s userState variable appropriately. In special cases
where an app is installed for all users, then all the users’
userState variables are marked as installed. Since all
users share the same app package information, a user can
intentionally upgrade and even replace other users’ packages.
The most significant security impact is two-fold:
First, one user may escalate the permissions of apps
belonging to a second user. For example, the latest version of
Twitter requires an extra permission, READ_SMS, compared
to the old version. The owner may choose not to upgrade to
the latest one for privacy concern. However, a secondary user
just updates the app through Google Play because she likes
the new features. As a result, this update event will update
all users’ apps (if installed) without other users’ consent.
The newly updated package requests more permissions and
performs different computing logic than the old one. In this
scenario, a secondary user grants a new permission to Twitter
on behalf of all the users instead of just herself.
Second, a user may have a chance to affect other users’
Fig. 5. New package installation is denied due to existing package with the
same name but different signature.
app installation by creating denial of service (DoS) attacks in
two ways. First, a user can fake a package to issue a DoS on
package installation by installing a fake Facebook app before
other users install the legitimate one. In such a case, no one
else can install the legitimate app anymore, and no one else can
uninstall the faked package through the user interface. Only the
owner can force uninstalls using adb.
Another negative side-effect of all users sharing the same
appId as mentioned in Section II, is that one user may use
up all the appId values which prevents other users from
installing any apps. We confirmed this by installing 50,000
dummy apps on a Nexus 10 running KitKat 4.4 as a secondary
user, thus using up all available appIds. As a result, any
other user including the owner cannot install apps any more.
The Android log shows that the installation failure is because
INSTALL_FAILED_INSUFFICIENT_STORAGE, but actu-
ally there is still space in data partition. The failure is because
all users share the same appId range.
The root cause for code sharing problem is that Android
does not provide clear code separation for different users.
All the users share the same package information including
app code, appIds, and their privileges for installing apps is
mixed together. The package manager fails to isolate the code
space of each user, although this design significantly saves the
valuable disk space.
V. RELATED WORK
Our work is inspired by those who have reported on
confused deputies [12], [13], [14], [15], [16], [17], component
hijacking [18], and capability leaks [11], [19] in Android.
However, these focus on maliciousness among apps, while
our work addresses this among users. Several studies [20],
[21], [22], [23] have explored the use of motion sensors
available on smartphones to perform user activity recognition,
while [24], [25], [26], [27], [28] have focused on inferring
user keyboard presses, icon taps and secure inputs using
accelerometer and gyroscope sensor. Nonetheless, these do not
consider unauthorized use of these sensors by other users of
the device as we do. Finally, [29] and [30] present complete
secure multi-user architectures which may have application in
solving some of the problems we have pointed out.
VI. CONCLUSION
We have described the basics of multi-user support in
Android and outlined a systematic approach to studying
whether Android’s security model is properly adapted to this
new environment. Our investigation methodology does not
begin with a particular attack, threat model, or vulnerability,
but instead seeks to provide insights into potential problems
9
through a comprehensive analysis of all subject-object com-
binations. With these insights, we are able to put forth a
number of hypotheses related to specific attacks. We describe
the experiments designed to test these, and the findings for
each. Our results indicate that several of our hypothesized
concerns are in fact true. Some findings, such as those related
to MediaServer, may be relatively easy to address by
adding additional access control logic at key locations. Others
however, such as ones stemming from Android’s approach
to package management, are architectural issues which will
require system design changes. Since we believe it to be
inevitable that Android will continue its expansion into en-
vironments where user trustworthiness cannot be relied upon,
we see a clear need to continue the systematic investigations
we describe.
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